

Since the current situation of Europe and the West can be described as the end of the end of history, and thus as the end of belief in an unshakeable continuity of the European, modern civilisation in its uniform, universal and dominant character, it is thus obviously not possible to avoid questions of what this actually means. It's also not possible to avoid the lack of answers that we are faced with. But it just might be that the lack of answers is the essence of the current state of affairs, and although this most frequently fills us – people created by the civilisation of the end of history – with uncontrollable fear and a sense of helplessness, this juncture is actually the source of possible hope: the fact that we no longer know the future. For perhaps what disappears is the greatest cause of our soothing comfort and increasingly disturbing lack of spiritual curiosity. Certainly the end of the end of history signifies that the knowledge we asked about at the onset, that is of the political history of the nineteenth and twentieth century, is becoming or is already “closed” knowledge. This does not by any measure mean it is useless knowledge. Derived from reflection upon various phenomena of the entire, combined nineteenth and twentieth century processes, it still allows us to understand what contemporary Europe became and where the roots of its current weaknesses lie; nevertheless, and this we must accept, it tells us less and less or even nothing at all about what the future holds for Europe. For it is knowledge that functions in a particular model of Western modernity, which on account of various factors such as internal crises and global forces is approaching its end – as the end of “the end of history”: a certain history. I don't want to assert that the status of this knowledge is now similar to the knowledge of the complexity of events in ancient Greece in the times when it stopped being taken into account, while Rome became identified with the reality of the globalised world of that day. It's not yet antique knowledge or at best classical knowledge. It continues to hold practical and deeper applicability, and for this reason should not be discarded.

The lack of historical sensitivity that is typical for the contemporary European is a source of political weakness. Thanks to historical knowledge there is still much that we can understand in existing and continually influential political phenomena. Thus, the political history of the nineteenth century still explains the complicated psychological state of relations between the Germans and the French, which remain till this day, but have their real genesis in the events of 1807; it uncovers the causes of unclear German-Italian relations, that are closely related to the circumstances of the emergence of both modern European states; it shows the secret alliance between Hungarians and Germans, as well as the intimacy between Czechs and Russians. It will prevent us from fantasising about Central Europe as remaining significant politically after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy; make us

aware of the inability to overcome the incompatibility of the British to continental matters; the strategic connection between France and Russia; as well as the unclear and uncertain character of American Prometheism in relation to Europe, as well as many other matters. That is enough for now concerning the practical meaning of various political questions. There are nevertheless issues that are more profound, which on the other hand make it possible to understand the irresolvable nature of Europe's spiritual crisis, that is the result of developing European modernity, the civilisation of the end of history. I mean here such issues as the connections between capitalism, democracy and individualism, or the opposition between the civilisation of culture and religion, created by liberalism by means of modern imperialism: through the evolution of nationalism or the endless faith in scientific progress, with an undercurrent of nihilism. All this leads to the development of such an image of humanity and the world, which becomes the source of a spiritual crisis, and attempts at overcoming this crisis that rest on the notion of the inescapable end of history.

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